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A sound evaluation of every bioethical problem should be predicated on a careful analysis of at least two basic elements: (i) reliable
scientiﬁc information and (ii) the ethical principles and values at stake. A thorough evaluation of both elements also calls for
a careful examination of statements by authoritative institutions. Unfortunately, in the case of medically complex living donors
neither element gives clear-cut answers to the ethical problems raised. Likewise, institutionary documents frequently oﬀer only
general criteria, which are not very helpful when making practical choices. This paper ﬁrst introduces a brief overview of scientiﬁc
information, ethical values, and institutionary documents; the notions of “acceptable risk” and “minimal risk” are then brieﬂy
examined, with reference to the problem of medically complex living donors. The so-called precautionary principle and the value
of solidarity are then discussed as oﬀering a possible approach to the ethical problem of medically complex living donors.
1.Introduction
The debate concerning the most valid approach in bioethics
is always open [1]. Whatever ethical perspective one chooses
to adopt as a starting point, the analysis must necessarily be
founded on two main basic elements: sound scientiﬁc facts
and the ethical values and principles at stake.
The ﬁrst part of this article gives a brief overview of the
main scientiﬁc and clinical information, with no claim to
completeness.
Beneﬁcence, nonmaleﬁcence, and autonomy are then
brieﬂy discussed, as they are considered the most relevant
ethical values involved in organ donation from living per-
sons.
Areliableanalysisoftheseissuesshouldalsotakeaccount
of the relevant statements made by authoritative national,
international, and supranational institutions.
Unfortunately, neither scientiﬁc data, nor ethical values,
nor institutionary documents give precise answers to the
ethical questions raised by the problem of explants from
medically complex living donors.
Surgicalrisksshouldalsobeweighedagainsttheso-called
“minimal risk” and the notion of risk acceptability. Both
these issues are brieﬂy discussed, bearing in mind another
crucial issue: informed consent.
All of these issues require adequate national policies in
order to promote harmonisation of the practices adopted in
diﬀerent transplant centres.
Finally, precaution and solidarity are discussed as being
important valuesintheevaluationofpotential living donors:
the precautionary principle is not wholly relevant while
solidarity is, in every case, one of the most lofty of human
attributes.
2. Risks for Medically Complex Living Donors:
An Overview
Scientiﬁc facts are the ﬁrst basic element for a sound ethical
evaluation.
Some “medically complex conditions” do not preclude
the possibility of donating a kidney: physical conditions
(e.g., hypertension, advanced age, obesity, nephrolithiasis,
proteinuria, haematuria, smoking, and drug abuse), familial
genetic diseases (e.g., polycystic kidney disease, Alport
syndrome, sickle cell trait, and thin basement membrane2 Journal of Transplantation
disease), and physicalanomalies in the kidney (e.g., cysts and
small renal cell cancers, arterial anomalies, and ﬁbromuscu-
lar dysplasia) [2].
An exhaustive review of the medical literature on all the
factors that impinge on the health of living kidney donors is
beyond the scope of this article. However, a general overview
of the literature shows that the scientiﬁc data are not clear:
“The transplant professional who is faced with counselling
a complex donor is confronted with sparse and unsatisfying
data about the magnitude of long-term risks” [3].
Some of the diﬃculties encountered when assessing risks
arise not only when medically complex living donors are
involved, but also in more general cases of living kidney
donations.
An extensive, long-term, and comprehensive examina-
tion of donor outcomes performed by Ibrahim and coau-
thors showed that “the overall evidence suggests that living
kidney donors have survival similar to that of nondonors
and that their risk of end-stage renal disease (ESRD) is not
increased” and that “survival and the risk of ESRD in care-
fully screened kidney donors appear to be similar to those in
the general population. Most donors who were studied had a
preserved GFR (glomerular ﬁltration rate), normal albumin
excretion, and an excellent quality of life” [4, 5].
A survey conducted at Johns Hopkins University that
examined all 80,347 living kidney donations performed in
the United States between 1994 and 2009 likewise showed
that “living donation is a safe process for donors” [6].
However, some authoritative experts cite “growing con-
cerns about safety of donors” and “the long-term outcome
for living donors remains uncertain” [7]: “although the
short-term beneﬁt-risk ratio in LDKT (living donor kidney
transplantation) is favourable for recipients and donors, the
long-term beneﬁt-risk ratio for donors might not be so
favourable” [8].
In spite of the presence of some risks, living kidney
donation from healthy people is generally considered a safe
procedure for donors [9].
The three conditions most frequently encountered in
medically complex living donors are hypertension, obesity,
and nephrolithiasis. For these conditions too the available
data are not univocal.
As regards hypertensive living donors, the largest study
was published by Textor and colleagues. The results are
intriguing, as they suggest that living kidney donors who
adopt a healthy lifestyle may actually beneﬁt in terms of
long-term renal function and cardiovascular risk [10, 11].
Some transplant professionals have been reluctant to accept
these results as evidence of the long-term safety of accepting
hypertensive patients as donors [12]a n dh y p e r t e n s i o n
continues to be considered, at least in speciﬁc conditions, as
a contraindication to living donation by the United Network
for Organ Sharing (UNOS) and the US Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network (OPTN) [13].
As regards obesity, “increased body mass index has been
associated with risk of proteinuria and focal segmental
glomerulosclerosis, and kidney function for obese donors
also can be harmed indirectly through increased rates of
diabetes, hypertension, and the metabolic syndrome” [14].
As regards nephrolithiasis “there are fewer data” [3].
“The shortcomings of the published evidence of long-
term risks to living kidney donors with hypertension,
nephrolithiasis, and obesity are evident; the data for donors
with other risk factors likewise are sparse. Changing demo-
graphics, increasing life expectancy, and better therapies for
CKD (chronic kidney disease) make quantifying the long-
term risk of living kidney donation for complex donors even
more problematic” [3].
This situation complicates both risk assessment and
ethical opinions.
Regardlessofgoodsuccessrates,recoveryrates,andpost-
operative functionality with one less organ, organ removal
causesdeﬁnitethoughnotincapacitatingharm(cuttingopen
the body and removing a healthy organ), and leaves the
donor at risk of other complications associated with surgical
interventions (Glannon).
3. Values at Stake and Conﬂict between Values
The second element of ethical evaluation is the whole of
human values.
The three major ethical principles that should guide
transplant professionals in their approach to the issue of
complex donors are: beneﬁcence to the recipient, non-
maleﬁcence regarding the donor, and the donor’s right to
autonomy. However, several conﬂicts between the diﬀerent
principles may arise.
As regards beneﬁcence, the main contradiction consists
in the fact that while it implies a strong argument in favour
ofensuringthebestmedicaltreatmentforpatientswithrenal
disease who are waiting for a transplant, the requirement
of nonmaleﬁcence (the notion, reaﬃrmed in every code of
medical ethics, that medical professionals have a duty to “do
no harm”) conﬂicts with substantial risks for living donors:
in other words, the principle of nonmaleﬁcence is threatened
by a scenario in which living donors must undergo a surgical
procedure that carries a range of substantial risks, including
death. Unlike standard surgery, the removal of a viable organ
from a living donor for transplantation is not performed for
the therapeutic beneﬁt of the patient: on the contrary, it not
only places the donor at risk from the surgical procedure
and from postoperative complications, but also implies (in
the case of nonregenerative organs) all the disadvantages
consequent on the loss of an organ.
While these problems apply to living organ donation
in general, they become even more intricate in the case of
medically complex living donors.
However, notwithstanding these issues, donations by
legally competent volunteers who are aware of the issues at
stake are recognised as generous and unselﬁsh acts, making
it permissible to subject living donors to risks that may not
otherwise be imposed on them. The problem is thus not the
existence of risks but the level of acceptability of those risks
(discussed below).
“Having beneﬁcence and nonmaleﬁcence in direct oppo-
sition is an unusual ethical scenario. One may conceptualise
the ‘opposing’ demands placed by beneﬁcence and non-
maleﬁcence as weights balancing like a seesaw on a fulcrumJournal of Transplantation 3
of autonomy. In practice, donor autonomy can be respected
only by strict adherence to informed consent. Without
ensuring valid informed consent on the part of prospective
donors, the ethical tension between the responsibility to help
transplant candidates and the well-founded concern about
harming donors cannot be resolved by appealing to donor
autonomy” [3].
At this point the issue of autonomy has to be addressed.
An autonomous decision is commonly understood in the
medical literature as an act of self determination performed
by a competent person. Autonomy (literally: “self-rule”)
certainly includes the right not to donate. The question as
to whether or not it also includes the right to donate is more
complex. In other words, the problem is to decide how far
should the respect for autonomy go.
The autonomy of a donor who wants to donate may
conﬂict with the doctor’s duty not to harm. However, this
does not necessarily happen. As T. M. Wilkinson observes,
“It is sometimes thought that living donor transplantation
involves a clash between the duty not to harm and the
duty to respect autonomy. This is somewhat misleading,
however, because of plausible developments of the under-
lying principles, doing no harm need not speak against live
donation and respecting autonomy need not speak in its
favour” [15]. In other words, the middle position need not
be a compromise between avoiding harm and autonomy: the
rule not to do harm does not automatically rule out living
donor transplantation, nor does autonomy clearly justify it.
A thorough analysis of the two elements (scientiﬁc
information and values) also requires a careful reading of
documents from authoritative institutions.
4. InstitutionaryRecommendations,
Opinions,and Codes
The general recommendations provided in institutionary
documents are considered authoritative points of reference
for those who have to deal with the problems raised
by medically complex living donors. Unfortunately, these
statements are often general in their approach and do not
provide practical guidance on the speciﬁc ethical problems
associated with these cases.
This section mentions a few examples from the many
available sources. The list (in alphabetical order by country)
makes no claims to completeness.
4.1. National Bioethics Committees and Commissions. From
an ethical perspective, the documents published by National
Bioethics Committees are particularly signiﬁcant.
In [16],theNationalHealthandMedicalResearchCoun-
ciloftheAustralianGovernmentstates:“Thereshouldnotbe
more than a low probability of serious harm to the donor”,
but fails to deﬁne either “low probability” or “serious harm.”
As regards the risk-beneﬁt balance, in [17], the Science
and Technology Ethics Committee of Quebec, Canada
(Commission de l’´ Ethique de la Science et de la Technologie
du Qu´ ebec, Canada) attaches particular importance to
informed consent (“Donor autonomy can be protected
by means such as providing donors with all relevant
information on the potential risks and beneﬁts and allowing
them to withdraw consent conﬁdentially at the time of
evaluation”) and to the psychological beneﬁts to the donor
(“The beneﬁt to the donor is psychological: saving the life of
kin, a child, a spouse, or a friend or signiﬁcantly improving
the quality of life of a loved one is a considerable—and even
vital—beneﬁt to the donor.”)
The Danish Council on Ethics does not address the issue
of organ donation by living donors in its 2008 report “Organ
donation. Ethical deliberations and recommendations”[ 18].
Similarly, in its opinion no. 115 “Questions d’´ ethique
relatives au pr´ el` evement et au don d’organes ` ad e sﬁ n sd e
transplantation”, the French Comit´ e Consultatif National
d’´ Ethique pour les Sciences de la Vie et de la Sant´ e( N a t i o n a l
Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences)
does not mention the problem of risks for donors [19].
In the information leaﬂet titled “Organ donation: the
gift of life?” published by the Irish Council on Bioethics the
paragraph “What are the ethical issues associated with live
organ donation?” mentions the absence of beneﬁt for living
donors, but gives no details of the risks involved [20].
According to the Italian Comitato Nazionale per la
Bioetica (National Bioethics Committee) “The removal from
living donors should not take place in case of excessive risks
for the donor” [21].
The document “Don d’organes solides par des personnes
vivantes. Directives m´ edico-´ ethiques et recommandations”b y
the Acad´ emie Suisse de Sciences M´ edicales (Swiss Academy
of Medical Sciences) [22] devotes a paragraph to “donors
in particular situations” (“donneurs en situations partic-
uli` eres”) but does not consider particular clinical situations.
The “particular situations” are “donneurs souﬀrants d’un
trouble mental, donneurs dont le partennaire de vie refuse
le don, donneurs issus d’une autre culture, donneurs qui
r´ efusent la transfusion sanguigne” (donors suﬀering from
mental problems, donors whose partners refuse the dona-
tion, donors from diﬀerent cultural backgrounds, donors
who refuse blood transfusions). According to the Swiss
Academy “les risques m´ edicaux pour le donneur et pour le
receveur doivent ˆ etre ´ evalu´ es individuellement et pr´ esenter
un rapport ´ equilibr´ ea v e cl eb ´ en´ eﬁce potentiel du don pour
les deux parties” (the medical risks for donor and recipient
should be evaluated individually and should be equal to the
potential beneﬁt of the donation for both parties).
4.2. Other Institutions. The “Guiding principle no. 3” of
the World Health Organisation’s “Guiding principles on
human organ transplantation” states: “Live donations are
acceptablewhenthedonor’sinformedandvoluntaryconsent
is obtained, when professional care of donors is ensured and
followup is well organised, and when selection criteria for
donors are scrupulously applied and monitored. Live donors
should be informed of the probable risks, beneﬁts, and
consequences of donation in a complete and understandable
fashion; they should be legally competent and capable of
weighing the information; they should be acting willingly,
free of any undue inﬂuence or coercion” [23].
On the subject of living donors, the “World Medical
Association Statement on human organ donation and4 Journal of Transplantation
transplantation” underlines that donors should “be provided
with meaningful and relevant information. Normally, this
will include information about (...) the beneﬁts and risks of
transplantation” [24], but does not mention the criteria to
be used when assessing beneﬁts and risks.
The “Convention on human rights and biomedicine”[ 25]
drawn up by the Council of Europe prescribes that “Removal
of organs or tissue from a living person for transplantation
purposesmaybecarriedoutsolelyforthetherapeuticbeneﬁt
of the recipient and where there is no suitable organ or tissue
available from a deceased person and no other alternative
therapeutic method of comparable eﬀectiveness” (Article
19). As regards the risks for living donors, the “Additional
protocol to the convention on human rights and biomedicine
concerning transplantation of organs and tissues of human
origin”[ 26] states that: “Before organ or tissue removal,
appropriate medical investigations and interventions shall be
carriedouttoevaluateandreducephysicalandpsychological
risks to the health of the donor. The removal may not be
carried out if there is a serious risk to the life or health of
the donor” (Article 11).
More speciﬁc and practical criteria are laid down by the
Ethics Committee of the Transplantation Society in “The
consensus statement of the amsterdam forum on the care of
the live kidney donor”. The committee recommends that:
“Prior to a live kidney donation to a potential recipient
(known by the potential donor or not known in the
circumstance of anonymous donation), the donor must
receive a complete medical and psychosocial evaluation to
include quantiﬁcation (as available) and assessment of the
riskofdonornephrectomyontheindividual’soverallhealth”
[27]. The committee does not suggest any ethical criteria
for assessing the risk, though it underlines the potential
complications involved. However, detailed clinical criteria
are given in the accompanying report [28, 29].
5.Textbooks andHandbookson Bioethics
Many textbooks and manuals on bioethics contain at least
one chapter on the ethics of organ transplantation. However,
most either fail to address the problem of medically complex
living donors or mention them only brieﬂy.
In the British Medical Association’s (BMA) handbook
“Medical ethics today”[ 30] a paragraph about organ dona-
tion from living doors begins with the question “What level
ofriskisacceptable?”AccordingtotheBMA“ithaslongbeen
accepted that competent adults are entitled to put themselves
at risk to help other people (...). Having accepted that, as a
general principle, people may expose themselves to risk for
the beneﬁt of another person, are there limits to the extent of
that risk? If a surgeon removed, for donation, an individual’s
hearth,resultinginthepatient’sinevitabledeath,anyconsent
would be invalid since the surgeon would commit murder.
Apart from such extremes, however, there is no legal restric-
tion on the extent of risk to which individuals may expose
themselves in the process of donating organs. Arguably, it is
for the competent individual, who has suﬃcient information
and is acting voluntarily, to establish what level of risk he
or she is willing to take. Of course, there are also some
external controls over such matters. There are independent
checks for those who are not genetically related. In addition,
surgeons cannot be forced to act contrary to their clinical
judgment and any surgeon asked to undertake the operation
would need to be satisﬁed not only that the potential donor
was truly competent, informed, and acting voluntarily, but
also that the overall beneﬁts of carrying out the procedure
outweighed the harms. The BMA believes it is right that the
level of harm to which people can give consent is limited but,
as in other areas, resists the imposition of inﬂexible rules.
Each case needs to be considered individually and, if the
health professionals concerned believe that the risks are too
great, the decision and the reasons for it should be sensitively
explained to both the potential donor and the recipient”
[30].
According to “The Cambridge textbook of bioethics” the
medical team is responsible for risk assessment for living
donors: “Assessments of medical suitability will depend on
which organ is being donated and will be carried out by the
team physicians” [31]. Moreover, the authors underline that
informed consent is crucial: “With respect to informed con-
sent, a donor must be fully and accurately informed about,
and demonstrate an understanding of, the risks and beneﬁts
of donation as it aﬀects themselves and the recipient.”
“T h eO x f o r dh a n d b o o ko fb i o e t h i c s ” does not address the
problemofrisksinlivingorgandonation:itsimplymentions
afewconsiderationsonthequestionofresourceallocationin
US health policies [32].
Likewise, the “Handbook of bioethics: taking stock of
t h eﬁ e l df r o map h i l o s o p h i c a lp e r s p e c t i v e ” deals with organ
transplantation in a chapter about resource allocation and
does not discuss the problem of risks for living donors
[33].
In “A companion to bioethics”, most of the paragraph
on “procurement from the living” deals with the problem
of paid donations. As regards risks, the authors merely
underline that, in the framework of the Human Tissue Act
“there are legal limits to the extent to which harm to others is
allowable, even with consent: a surgeon is not allowed to go
a l o n gw i t hy o u rw i s ht od o n a t ey o u rh e a r t ”[ 34].
According to the manual “Healthcare ethics. A theological
analysis”: “The functional integrity of the donor as a
human person will not be impaired, even though anatomical
integrity may suﬀer” [35].
Many texts and reports on organ donation and trans-
plantation contain at least one chapter on ethical issues, but
they usually devote little space to the ethical problems raised
by living donations from medically complex donors. For
example, the report entitled “Organ donation: opportunities
for action” by the Committee on Increased Rates of Organ
Donation of the Institute of Medicine [36] does not address
this speciﬁc ethical problem.
6. The Problem of Risk Assessment
An acceptable risk-beneﬁt ratio is a prerequisite for a
living organ donation: the careful weighing of this aspect
is absolutely necessary for a sound ethical analysis of the
problem of medically complex living donors.Journal of Transplantation 5
From a general perspective, two equally crucial
constituents of risk should be examined: the probability
(“hazard”) and the magnitude (“risk”) of the potential
harm, cost, or burden. Although the expression “risk-beneﬁt
ratio” is commonly used, a more precise formulation would
be “probable risk-probable beneﬁt ratio.” Medical ethics
and the law usually adopt a broader deﬁnition of “harm”
that includes not only physical harm, but also psychological
or social harm. For example, parents suﬀer greatly if their
children die, but the burden would be even greater if they
could have saved their children by donating an organ and
were unable to do so: although the operation would place
the parent at risk of harm, failure to operate could lead to an
even greater risk of psychological harm.
If the possible mental harm consequent on not donating
outweighs the physical harm possibly associated with donat-
ing, then an explant from a living donor does not violate
the basic ethical rule to do no harm. However, once it is
accepted that the physical risk is not the only relevant issue,
the problem is to weigh the risks and to decide who is to do
the weighing. Surgeons and other medical members of the
transplant team might be authorities on the physical risks
to the donor, but are probably not best suited to assess the
nonclinical risks and how they compare with the potential
beneﬁts. Transplant teams that include psychiatrists, social
workers, and similar experts probably have a more complete
view of the risks and beneﬁts involved. The problem of
deciding who is responsible for the “probable risk-probable
beneﬁt” assessment belongs to the ethical argument as to
who is the “best judge” that recurs in discussions about
paternalism: there is a large body of literature on the subject
of the “best judge” (dating from the dawn of bioethics as a
new branch of knowledge) [37] and who is entitled to take
on the role, both in general and in speciﬁc circumstances,
but this discussion would lead us too far from our subject.
According to a review of these issues “the fundamen-
tal ethical problem with accepting complex living donors
is limited medical information about the magnitude of
potential risk. If data about donor risk are misrepresented,
then donor autonomy is undermined. This ethical problem
remains challenging even with current attempts to maximise
the independence and the integrity of the informed consent
process. If a member of the transplant team senses that the
informed consent process is not protecting a complex donor
adequately, then the centre should refuse the donor. One
might ask whether the centre then is permitting paternalism
to supersede a donor’s right to autonomy, but transplant
professionals, as a team, must feel ethically comfortable with
the decision to accept or refuse each donor. The conscience
of each member of the transplant team merits protection,
evenifadecisiontorejectakidneydonorseemspaternalistic.
Physicians have the right to impose their own sense of
acceptable risk in oﬀering procedures to their patients” [3].
For an ethical analysis of the “probable risk-probable
beneﬁt ratio,” two other notions should be borne in mind:
the“acceptablerisk”andthe“minimalrisk.”Both“minimal”
and “acceptable” risks should be evaluated on a scientiﬁc
basis, but they are more a social choice than a scientiﬁc
cut-oﬀ.
6.1. The Notion of “Acceptable Risk”. Most of the literature
on the ethical implications of risk acceptability in living
donor transplantations concerns the issue of tolerability by
recipients.
“It seems that some potential transplant recipients who
arenearingdeathfromtheirorganfailurewouldrationallybe
willing to accept an organ from someone with a malignancy
that appears not to have spread. We need to ask whether the
prohibition on procuring organs from persons with cancer
is really based on the interest of the potential recipient
or whether it is more to serve the psychological needs of
surgeons (...). It is hard to imagine an argument supporting
a categorical prohibition on transplant from organ donors
with cancer” [38]. Maple and coauthors performed a survey
“to investigate risk perception relating to living kidney
donation, to compare the risk donors would accept with
current practice and identify inﬂuential factors,” According
to their data “kidney donors will accept a higher risk of death
than is currently quoted, especially if risks are presented in
terms of chance of survival” [39].
The concept of “acceptable risk” is highly subjective
and depends on circumstances: the same risk level may
be acceptable in some contexts but unacceptable in others.
When addressing the issue of “acceptable risk” for medically
complex living donors it is necessary to consider each case
carefully on its individual merits.
6.2. The Notion of “Minimal Risk”. T h eR o y a lC o l l e g eo f
Physicians [40, 41] has used the term “minimal risk” to
describe two situations: (1) a small chance of a reaction that
is trivial in itself, such as a headache or a feeling of lethargy
and (2) a very remote chance of a serious disability or death.
Inthesecondsituation,therisktothevolunteershouldbeno
greater than that of being a passenger on a scheduled ﬂight.
The US Code of Federal Regulations deﬁnes a risk as
“minimal” if the “probability and magnitude of harm or
discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in
and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in
daily life or during the performance of routine physical or
physiological examinations or tests” [42]. This deﬁnition is
open to discussion, but the debate concerns mainly clinical
trials [43].
Nephrectomy by its nature exposes the living donor to
risks undoubtedly higher than any “routine” examination;
it is nonetheless considered “acceptable” since the available
data conﬁrm its essential safety and the quality of postopera-
tive functions.
7. Informed Consent
Informed consent is a cardinal issue in medical ethics. It
usually requires a competent patient, comprehension of all
the circumstances, the absence of coercion, and an objective
presentation of meaningful information about the risks and
beneﬁts involved [44]. In the case of complex living donors,
theﬁrstthreeelementsmustbeascertainedanddocumented;
the problems raised by the other requirement are more
challenging: consent for organ donation requires “balancing
conﬂicting ethical obligations” [45].6 Journal of Transplantation
Some believe that even competent living donors should
not be used because their consent can never be determined
tobefree[46].Thisisgoingtoofar:authoritativeinstitutions
agree that living organ donation is not only ethically accept-
a b l eb u ti sa nu n s e l ﬁ s hg e s t u r ew i t hah i g hm o r a lv a l u e[ 47].
There is also the question of whether transplant teams
should be obliged to perform operations whenever there are
willing recipients and donors. Even if recipients and donors
have a right to consent, they do not have a right to insist on
donation.Itispreferablethatteamsbeallowedawidemargin
of discretion. But having the discretion does not tell them
how to exercise it.
The adequacy of informed consent should be examined
systematically for every donor, though methods to protect
the consent process may vary between centres.
It is common practice for both donor and recipient to be
evaluated by diﬀerent experts. The team that evaluates the
potential donor should promote only the donor’s interests,
and care should be taken to avoid external inﬂuences on this
relationship.
Donors should also be provided with multiple opportu-
nities to rescind their decision to donate during the course
of their workup [48]. Some transplant professionals and
ethicists have argued that potential donors who opt out of
donation for personal reasons should be allowed to represent
their decision as having been taken for an undisclosed
“medical” reason, in order to protect the potential donor’s
relationship with the recipient and others [49].
8.NeedtoHarmonisePractices
The disparity between the kidney donor supply and the
kidney transplant waiting list has focused attention on living
donation as a useful means to increase the supply of organs
for transplant candidates.
Many nations have introduced initiatives to promote
the donation of living organs. For example, on January 17,
2009 the National Kidney Foundation adopted a “Position
statement on increasing organ donation and transplantation
in the United States” and promoted the “End The Wait”
initiative [50], and on November 17, 2008 the Italian
National Transplant Centre adopted the “Documento infor-
mativo sul trapianto di rene da donatore vivente”[ 51].
(“Information paper on kidney transplantations from living
donors.”) The UK, Human Tissue Authority completed a
public consultation programme to ensure that the current
procedures to assess living donors are suﬃciently robust [52]
and its annual public meeting featured a discussion on the
topic [53].
Initiatives at the national level are important to pro-
mote scientiﬁcally and ethically sound policies, as well
as to encourage improved harmonisation of the practices
adopted by diﬀerent centres: in many countries considerable
variations exist regarding how transplant centres present
risk, perform psychosocial evaluations, and decide whether
to accept medically complex donors. It is important that
potential strategies to protect complex donors, as well as the
public’strustinlivingdonortransplantation,include,among
otherelements,theestablishmentofminimumguidelinesfor
donor evaluation in all centres.
“The decision as to whether a complex potential donor
should be accepted should be placed within a well-informed
ethical, and legal framework that acknowledges limits on
data and provides for independent sources of opinion for
prospective donors” [3]. Reese et al. proposed a “medical,
ethical, and legal” strategy for complex living donors and
summarised it in the following points: “Maximise inde-
pendence of donor evaluation; improve informed consent
process;educatetransplantpractitionersaboutlegalenviron-
ment; protect patients from harm; identify which risk factors
are clinically important; maximise likelihood that medical
complications are identiﬁed and treated” [3].
The inclusion of a “donor advocate” on the staﬀ of a
transplant centre may oﬀer an opportunity for the donor’s
interests to be represented by a nonpartisan professional.
Ideally, a donor advocate would have a thorough medical
understanding of kidney donation, would not answer to
the transplant staﬀ, and would be extraneous to incentives
that promote the acceptance of complex donors [54], but
issues related to recruiting, training, and compensating such
advocates could present substantial barriers; no clear model
for such a donor advocacy programme is currently available.
Centres could oﬀer potential complex donors an oppor-
tunity to discuss their decision in conﬁdence with previous
donors. Some potential donors may wish to discuss their
decision with previous donors with similar demographic
characteristics, such as race or gender. Another possible
strategy would be to test donors’ knowledge; as an example,
standard tests could be used to assess a donor’s comprehen-
sion of the risks before proceeding with surgery.
Multicentre, long-term studies of health outcomes for
complex donors are essential for a clinically signiﬁcant
understanding of the factors associated with risk. Ensuring
that long-term healthcare is provided for complex donors
could yield the dual beneﬁt of meeting an obligation
to donors who have made an altruistic sacriﬁce and of
facilitating the collection of information.
9. InSearch of Beacons:
PrecautionandSolidarity
From a general point of view, the overview in the previous
paragraphs shows that it is not easy to suggest practical
ethical guidelines for the risk assessment of medically
complex living donors. This is a typical situation in which
each case must be evaluated individually. It is also important
to remember that transplantation is typically not a one-party
event, but that at least three parties are involved: the donor,
the recipient, and the transplant team.
From an ethical perspective, precaution [55] and solidar-
ity [56] have been suggested as attitudes that can help give a
sense of orientation when faced with the problem of living
donors.
Precautionisaquestionofduty:itisacrucialprincipleto
be borne in mind when choices about risks have to be made,
but it is only partly relevant to the speciﬁc problem and isJournal of Transplantation 7
not fully applicable in the case of medically complex living
donors.
The notion of “solidarity” is one of the highest moral
attributes of human beings—and not only when organ
donations from living persons are the issue of the moment.
9.1. Precautionary Principle. It is often suggested that the
“precautionary principle” is a good point of departure (both
scientiﬁcally and ethically) when addressing sanitary and
health problems.
The precautionary principle holds that even in the
absence of scientiﬁc certainty that a particular course of
action is potentially harmful, cost-eﬀective, and proportion-
ate measures to prevent the risk of serious damage should be
adopted.
The principle was formulated in the 1970s, initially
in the context of environmental protection [57]. It was
later extended to various areas of public health and health
protection [58].
Since the 1980s, the precautionary principle has been
referred to in numerous institutional documents, conven-
tions, statements, treaties, and regulations [59]. Its most
notable aﬃrmation is contained in paragraph 15 of the “Rio
Declaration,” proclaimed in 1992 at the conclusion of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Health,
which reads, “In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-eﬀective
measures to prevent environmental degradation” [60].
The precautionary principle is therefore an action prin-
ciple that commits decision makers to take immediate
temporary, ﬂexible measures to deal with potential risks
in regard to which available scientiﬁc data are insuﬃcient,
uncertain, or contradictory.
This deﬁnition of the precautionary principle clearly
shows that several aspects do not apply to the problem
of medically complex living donors. The general context
within which the precautionary principle was elaborated—
environmental policies at the population level—is very
diﬀerent from that of health problems “at the bedside.”
However, it is reasonable to suggest that a similar cautionary
approach can also be adopted to deal with clinical problems
[61].
Some aspects of the precautionary principle (the uncer-
tainty, the potentially serious and permanent risks) do
apply to the problem of complex living donors. However,
other important aspects are not (at least directly) applicable
to organ donation: in particular, transplantation is not
a reversible measure. The fact that precautionary policies
are usually implemented at the population (rather than
individual) level and in an environmental (rather than
clinical) setting does not preclude the adoption of a pre-
cautionary approach as a criterion for transplantation. Even
if the precautionary principle is not strictly enforceable, a
cautionary approach is certainly obligatory where medically
complex living donors are involved.
9.2. Solidarity. Solidarity is one of the highest moral values
[62]. Solidarity, considered as a perception of mutual
obligations between the members of a community, is deeply
rooted in human experience and thinking.
According to “The short Routledge encyclopedia of philos-
ophy,” “solidarity exits among a group of people when they
are committed to abiding by the outcome of some process of
collective decision-making, or to promoting the wellbeing of
other members of the group, perhaps at signiﬁcant costs to
themselves. Many regard solidarity as an important political
ideal on the ground that it is related to community and
fraternity, and conductive to social cohesion and stability”
[63].
An attitude of solidarity has accompanied the evolution
of much of human thinking and cultural development.
Terence spoke of “humanitas,” Virgil of “pietas,” and Seneca
of “simpatia” [64]. In Christianity solidarity, or “caritas,” is
held in high regard [65].
In moral philosophy solidarity is seen as being open
and generous towards other people, putting their best
interest before our own, without expecting anything in
return. Solidarity provides a remedy to the overemphasis on
individualism in contemporary social ethics. Sociality and
solidarity principle (justice) include both justice in distri-
bution (“suum quique tribuere”: to each his/her own), and
in commutation (“neminem laedere”: do not harm anyone).
Solidarity is perceived as a caring and generous attitude
towards other people, as putting others’ best interests before
one’s own, with no expectation of reward [64].
A sense of togetherness oﬀers a solid foundation for
practices in healthcare.
InmanyWesterncountries,equityandsolidarity arecore
values of the National Health Services: according to these
modelsthestateisresponsibleforsafeguardingtheprinciples
of equal dignity and equal accessto citizenship rights [66].In
the European Union, solidarity is also a milestone in health
policies [67].
“Establishing the solidarity model is only a minor step
f o rcurr e ntallocatio np r ograms;ho w ev e r ,itisagr eatst epf o r
both patients and medical professionals. Patients will beneﬁt
for better access to organs, Medical professionals will beneﬁt,
because society would reduce the burden of (nonmedical)
value decisions under conditions of rationing” [68].
Solidarity is one of the brightest beacons for living organ
donations [69, 70]: “The core ethical norm of the medical
profession is the principle “do no harm.” The only way that
removing an organ from someone seems morally defensible
is if the donor chooses to undergo the harm of surgery solely
to help another, and if there is suﬃcient medical beneﬁt to
the recipient” [71].
“The right road to follow, until science is able to discover
other new forms and more advanced therapies, must be the
formation and the spreading of a culture of solidarity that is
open to all and does not exclude anyone” [72].
The retrieval of organs for transplantation from medi-
cally complex living donors can only be justiﬁed as a free and
disinterested expression of solidarity towards one’s human
fellows. Therefore, any policy aiming at increasing the
supply of organs should centre on stimulating humanitarian8 Journal of Transplantation
motivations and creating a diﬀused sensitivity towards the
suﬀerings of people needing organ transplantation [56].
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